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TECHNOLOGY AND TEEN SEX: THE NEED FOR
LEGISLATIVE ACTION IN RESPONSE TO 'SEXTING'

I.

INTRODUCTION

MaryJo Miller, mother of fourteen-year-old Marissa, was shocked to find her
daughter faced possible felony child pornography charges, stemming from a photograph
taken two years previously at a friend's slumber party.2 The picture displayed Marissa
from the waist up in an opaque bra.3 A lunchroom incident involving a teen 4 boy
displaying nude pictures of female classmates stored on his cell phone sparked the
investigation leading to the scrutiny of Marissa's image. 5 The investigation led to the
discovery of similar images, such as one of a seventeen-year-old girl in a towel wrapped
just below her breasts, resulting in numerous teens facing possible felony charges and
sex offender registration.6
In 2009, numerous parents, school officials, and law enforcement officers
discovered the meaning of "sexting," the conduct of sending sexually explicit photos via
cell phone. The concept has become a cultural phenomenon, evidenced by the plots of
the teen drama 902109 and Law & Order: Special Victims Unit.10 As entertaining as
these story lines may seem, it is imperative not to lose sight of the real-life effects of
felony sex convictions for teens. 1 1 Some debate the frequency and pervasiveness of
sexting among teens.12 However, there is no debating that the current state of child
pornography laws provides law enforcement officers the discretion to charge America's
youth with felony charges for sexting. 13 Rampant teen cell phone usage, 14 coupled with
1. The author would like to thank Professor Russell Christopher for his help in developing the subject
matter of this comment.
2. Dionne Searcey, A Lawyer, Some Teens and a Fight Over 'Sexting', WALL ST. J. (April 21, 2009),
http://online.wsj.com/article/SBl24026115528336397.html.
3. Id
4. For purposes of this comment, "teen" refers to individuals eighteen-years-old and younger.
5. Searcey, supra note 2.
6. Id
7. Robert D. Richards & Clay Calvert, When Sex and Cell Phones Collide: Inside the Prosecution of a
Teen Sexting Case, 32 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 1, 2-3 (2009).
8. Id. at 3.
9. 90210:To Sext or Not to Sext (CW television broadcast Sept. 15, 2009).
10. Law & Order, Special Victims Unit: Crush (ABC television broadcast May 5, 2009).
I1. See infra notes 303-315 and accompanying text.
12. See Sociologist: Few
Teens
'Sexting', UNITED
PRESS INT'L (Jan.
11,
2009),
http://www.upi.com/Top News/2009/01/ll /Sociologist-Few-teens-sexting/UPI-78141231654189/
(discussing the skepticism some possess concerning the prevalence of sexting).
13. See infra notes 60-83 and accompanying text.
14. See Cell PhonesKey to Teens' Social Lives, 47% Can Text with Eyes Closed, MARKETINGCHARTS.COM
(Sept. 23, 2008), http://www.marketingcharts.com/interactive/cell-phones-key-to-teens-social-lives-47-cantext-with-eyes-closed-6126/ (citing national survey conducted by CTIA and Harris Interactive).
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the broad terms of child pornography statutes, 15 unintentionally regulates teen sexual
behavior.16 In light of the expansive state of sex offender registry laws, sexting charges
can irreparably harm the lives of teens for decades, if not permanently.17
The recent trend to charge, or threaten to charge, teens for sexting under a state's
child pornography laws is contrary to the legislative intent of the statutes, thus
demonstrating the state's motivation is paternalistic; accordingly, child pornography
laws require amendment to reflect the "Romeo and Juliet" exceptions to statutory rape
and the intent of the teen producer. This comment first discusses the intent of child
pornography laws and the recent rise of sexting. Application of this intent to sexting
charges demonstrates the need for amendment of child pornography laws, based on the
current state of statutory rape laws and the intent of the teen producer, due to the state's
impermissible motives for charging teens with sexting.
II. BACKGROUND

A.

Overview of FederalLegislation Defining ChildPornography

Congress' purpose in enacting laws criminalizing pornography was the prevention
of exploitation and abuse of minors. 18 Before 1988, Congress attempted to confront
these concerns in two main ways: by banning all obscene pornography, regardless of the
age of the subject, and by banning all pornography depicting minors.19
Congress first enacted the Protection of Children Against Sexual Exploitation Act
("Act") of 1977.20 The Act was meant as a check on the rapidly growing child
pornography industry,21 which Congress felt was harmful to children's "physiological,
emotional, and mental health, as well as to the good of society as a whole." 22 In enacting
this legislation, which prohibited numerous aspects of child pornography, including
production, possession, and transmission,23 Congress noted this was the first time in its
history to directly criminalize the exploitation of minors.24 Congress stressed its purpose
was not to reach the "private relations of individuals, or those of consenting minors or
consenting adults," but to counteract the rapidly increasing commercial exploitation of
minors. 25
In response to the Supreme Court's 1982 decision New York v. Ferber,26 Congress
noted the "national tragedy" that was the "tens of thousands of children under the age of
18 . . . believed to be filmed or photographed while engaging in sexually explicit acts for
15. See infra.notes 60-83 and accompanying text.
16. See infra. notes 165-190 and accompanying text.
17. See infra notes 303-315 and accompanying text.
18. Deborah F. Buckman, Annotation, Validity, Construction, and Application of 18 U.S.CA. §
2252(A)(a), Proscribing Certain Activities Relating to Material Constituting or Containing Child
Pornography,2 A.L.R. Fed. 2d 533 (2005).
19. Connection Distrib. Co. v. Holder, 557 F.3d 321, 324 (6th Cir. 2009).
20. Protection of Children Against Sexual Exploitation Act of 1977, 18 U.S.C.A. § 2251 (West 1978).
21. Buckman, supranote 18, at 534.
22. Id. at 13 (citing S. REP.NO. 95-438, at 5 (1977), reprintedin 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 40).
23. Id.
24. 125 CONG. REc. H139 (daily ed. Jan. 24, 1978) (statement of Rep. Conyers).
25. Id.
26. N.Y. v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747 (1982).
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the producer's own pleasure or profit."27 Consequently, Congress determined the 1977
Act needed amendment.28 In Ferber, the Court examined, for the first time, the
constitutionality of a statute criminalizing images of children engaged in sexually
explicit conduct. 29
The Court determined the states' compelling interest 30 in protecting minors from
commercial exploitation and abuse outweighed the need to protect child pornography
under the First Amendment. 3 1 Thus, the Court upheld a New York statute categorizing
child pornography under a broader test than the general test for obscenity under Miller v.
California.32 Although the Court afforded states more leeway in defining child
pornography than obscenity in order to protect "the physiological, emotional, and mental
health" 33 of children, it stressed the need that conduct prohibited by the statute be clearly
and adequately defined.34
The Child Protection Act of 1984 ("CPA") cited Ferber,35 and the low number of
prosecutions under the Act, 36 as a call to extend its coverage. 37 The amendments deleted
the term "commercial purpose" from the legislation, attempting to reach those who
38
coerced children to engage in sexually explicit conduct, but not necessarily for profit.
39
Under the existing Act, the prosecutor had to prove the subject's age was sixteen.
The difficulty was compounded given the subjects of the images were generally unable
to be located.40 Therefore, the CPA raised the age of protection from sixteen to eighteen

27. H.R. REP. No. 98-536, at 492 (1983), reprintedin 1984 U.S.C.A.N. 492,493.
28. Id.
29. Ferber,458 U.S. at 753.
30. Id at 757 (citing Globe Newspaper Co. v. Super. Ct., 457 U.S. 596, 607 (1982)) (holding that the state's
interest in "safeguarding the physical and psychological well-being of a minor" is "compelling"); Prince v.
Mass., 321 U.S. 158, 168 (1944) (holding that a statute prohibiting the use of a child to distribute literature on
the street was valid despite the First Amendment implications).
31. Id. at 760 (citing David P. Shouvlin, Preventing the Sexual Exploitation of Children: A Model Act, 17
WAKE FOREST L. REv. 535, 545 (1981)) (explaining "pornography poses an even greater threat to the child
victim than does sexual abuse or prostitution. Because the child's actions are reduced to a recording, the
pornography may haunt him in future years, long after the original misdeed took place. A child who has posed
for a camera must go through life knowing that the recording is circulating within the mass distribution system
for child pornography").
32. Miller v. Cal., 413 U.S. 15, 24-5 (1973) (defining the test for obscenity as "(a) whether the 'average
person' . . . would find that the work, taken as a whole, appeals to the prurient interest, . . . (b) whether the

work depicts or describes in a patently offensive way, sexual conduct specifically defined by the applicable
state law; and (c) whether the work, taken as a whole lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific
value" (quoting Roth v. U.S., 354 U.S. 476, 489 (1957) (rejecting the "utterly without redeeming social value"
test of Memoirs v. Mass., 383 U.S. 413, 419 (1966), as unworkable))). Ferber defines the test for child
pornography as: "the trier of fact need not find that the material appeals to the prurient interest of the average
person; it is not required that sexual conduct portrayed be done so in a patently offensive manner; and the
material at issue need not be considered as a whole." Ferber,485 U.S. at 764,
33. Ferber,458 U.S. at 758 (quoting S. REP. No. 95-438, at 5 (1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 40)
(stating, "[T]he use of children as . . . subjects of pornographic materials is very harmful to both the children
and the society as a whole.").
34. Id. at 764.
35. Id. at 774.
36. H.R. REP. No.98-536 at 493 (stating that since the statute's enactment only twenty-eight persons had
been indicted under the Act).
37. Id. at 492-94.
38. Id. at 494.
39. Id.
40. Id. at 495.
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to facilitate prosecution. 4 1 Congress acknowledged its intention was to facilitate more
effective prosecution of images of sixteen-year-olds and younger, not expansion of the
42
images criminalized by the CPA.
Beginning in 1988, in light of technological developments, Congress amended the
Act multiple times in response to the difficulties faced in policing the world of child
pornography. 4 3 In order to keep up with technology, regulation of child pornography
44
expanded based on the means of production, in addition to the content. Congress
expanded the means of production encompassed by the Act through the Child Protection
and Obscenity Enforcement Act of 1988 ("CPOEA").4 5 CPOEA expanded the Act
including the movement of child pornography "by any means including the computer." 46
47
Subsequently, prosecution of child pornographers rose over 600 percent.
In 1996, the Child Pornography Prevention Act ("CPPA") attempted to broaden
the definition of child pornography to encompass virtual images of children.48 The
Supreme Court held two provisions of CPPA as unconstitutional infringements on the
First Amendment in Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition.49 The Court found that defining
child pornography to include virtual images merely resembling minors encompassed
additional images that were by no means harmful or abusive to children. 50 The interests
involved in protecting First Amendment rights outweighed the benefits of endorsing the
51
tenuous connection between the production of virtual pornography and child abuse.
The fact that the virtual images "[did] not involve, let alone harm, any children in the
production process" weighed heavily on the Court's decision in finding the provisions
overinclusive. 52
The Court discussed the realm of images covered that did not merit prosecution at
length. 5 3 In citing the artistic value of many works banned under the CPPA, the Supreme
Court noted, "[t]he statute proscribes the visual depiction of an idea-that of teenagers
engaging in sexual activity-that is a fact of modern society and has been a theme in art
41. H.R. REP.No. 98-536 at 495.
42. Id. (stating, this expansion "facilitate[d] the prosecution of child pornography cases and raise[d] the
effective age of protection of children from these practices, probably not to eighteen years of age, but perhaps
to sixteen").
43. Buckman, supra note 18, at 544.
44. Id.
45. Id. (citing Pub. L. No. 100-690, § 7511(b), 102 Stat. 4485, 4485 (1998)) (explaining, "This act was
enacted as part of the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-690, §1, 102 Stat. 4181"); see generally
Bradley Scott Shannon, The JurisdictionalLimits of FederalCriminal ChildPornographyLaw, 21 U. HAW. L.
REv. 73 (1999).
46. Buckman, supra note 18, at 544 (citing Pub. L. No. 100-690, § 7511(b), 102 Stat. 4485, 4485).
47. 134 CONG. REc. E3750 (daily ed. Oct. 21, 1988) (statement of Hon. Hughes).
48. Victoria Broussard, Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition: Legislators Pushfor Policy Direction to Protect
the Age of Innocence While the Court Turns a DeafEar, 29 T. MARSHALL L. REv. 419, 419-420 (2004) (citing
18 U.S.C.A. § 2256(8)(B) (West 2001) (defining pornography as "any visual depiction, including any
photograph, film, video, picture, or computer or computer generated image," that "is, or appears to be, of a
minor engaging in sexually explicit conduct") (emphasis added))) (held unconstitutional by Ashcroft v. Free
Speech Coal., 535 U.S. 234, 258 (2002)).
49. Free Speech Coal., 535 U.S. at 258 (holding §§ 2256(8)(B) and 2256(8)(D) substantially overbroad and
in violation of the First Amendment).
50. Id. at 241 (explaining that by implication one could be prosecuted for owning a Renaissance painting).
51. Id. at 258.
52. Id. at 241 (emphasis added).
53. Id at 247.
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and literature throughout the ages." 54 Under the statute's broad sweep, films or books
depicting stories such as Romeo and Juliet were obscene. 5 5 By designating the age of
eighteen, the statute prohibited images of subjects who in many states were older than
56
the legal age to marry and engage in consensual sexual relations.
In finding two provisions of CPPA overinclusive, the Court distinguished "teenage
sexual activity" from "sexual abuse." 57 The Court struck the statute down under Ferber,
because as opposed to the speech in Ferber, "speech that in itself [was] the record of
child abuse, the CPPA prohibit[ed] speech that record[ed] no crime and create[d] no
victim by its production. Virtual child pornography [was] not 'intrinsically related' to the
sexual abuse of children." 58 In Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition, the Supreme Court
clarified and reaffirmed Ferber's main holding that although the government could
define child pornography more broadly than obscenity in its attempted protection of
child victims, speech that was neither obscene nor the product of child abuse still
warranted considerable protection under the First Amendment.59
B.

State Laws Pertainingto Child Pornography

Although the definitions and elements concerning child pornography differ across
jurisdictions,60 every state currently has legislation aimed at criminalizing the production
and dissemination of child pornography.61 The broad terms within these statutes enable
54. Free Speech Coal., 535 U.S. at 246.
55. Id. at 247.

56. Id. (citing 18 U.S.C.A. § 2243(a) (West 2001)) (stating the age of consent in federal maritime and
territorial jurisdiction as 16); NATIONAL SURVEY OF STATE LAWS 384-388 (Richard A. Leiter ed., 3d ed. 1999)
(forty-eight states permit sixteen-year-olds to marry with parental consent).
57. Free Speech Coal., at 247-48.
58. Id. at 250 (emphasis added) (citing Ferber,458 U.S. at 759).
59. Id. at 251 (citing Ferber,458 U.S. at 764-65).
60. Stephen F. Smith, Jailfor Child Pornographers?:A Reply to ProfessorLeary, 15 VA. J. SOC. POL'Y &
L. 505, 513 (2008).
61. Commonwealth v. Davidson, 938 A.2d 198, 210 (Pa. 2007) (stating that as of 1990, only nineteen states
had promulgated statutes criminalizing possession of child pornography, but as of 2007 all fifty states had
statutes criminalizing child pornography); see ALA. CODE § 13A-12-192 (2009); ALASKA STAT. § 11.61.127
(West 2009); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-3553 (2009); ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-27-304 (West 2009); CAL.
PENAL CODE § 311.11 (West 2009); COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-6-403 (West 2009); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 53a196d (West 2009); DEL. CODE. ANN. tit. 11, § 1111 (West 2009); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 827.071 (West 2009);
GA. CODE ANN. § 16-12-100 (West 2009); HAW. REv. STAT. § 707-752 (West 2009); IDAHO CODE. ANN § 18507(A) (West 2009); 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/11-20.1 (West 2009); IND. CODE ANN. § 35-42-44 (West 2009);
IOWA CODE ANN. § 728.12 (West 2009); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-3516 (West 2008); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. §
531.335 (West 2009); LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 14:81.1 (2008) (amended by 2009 La. Sess. Law Serv. 382
(West)); 17 ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. § 2911 (2009); MD. CODE ANN. CRIM. LAW § 11-208 (West 2009);
MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 272, § 29C (West 2009); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 750.154c (West 2009);
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 617.247 (West 2009) (subd. 8 held unconstitutional in State v. Cannady, 727 N.W.2d 403
(Minn. 2007); Miss. CODE ANN. § 97-5-33 (West 2009); Mo. REV. STAT. § 568.060 (West 2009); MONT.
CODE ANN. § 45-5-625 (2008) (amended by 2009 Mont. Laws 198); NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-1463.05 (2009)
(amended by 2009 Neb. Laws 97); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 200.730 (West 2009); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §
649-A:3 (2009); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:24-4 (West 2009); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-6A-3 (West 2009); N.Y.
PENAL LAW §§ 263.11, 263.16 (McKinney 2009); N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 14-190.17A (West 2009); N.D.
CENT. CODE ANN. § 12.1-27.2-04.1 (West 2009); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2907.321 (West 2009); OKLA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 1024.2 (West 2009); OR. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 163.686-163.689 (West 2009); 18 PA.
CONS. STAT. ANN. § 6312 (West 2009); R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 11-9-1.3 (West 2009); S.C. CODE ANN. § 1615-410 (2008); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 22-24A-3 (2009); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-17-1003 (West 2009); TEX.
PENAL CODE ANN. § 43.26 (West 2009); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5a-3 (West 2009); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, §
2827 (West 2009); VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-374.1:1 (West 2009); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9.68A.070 (West
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juvenile prosecution for self-produced child pornography.62 For example, an Oklahoma
child pornography law states,
Every person who willfully and knowingly. ..

writes, composes, stereotypes, prints,

photographs, designs, copies, draws, engraves, paints, molds, cuts, or otherwise prepares,
publishes, sells, distributes, keeps for sale, knowingly downloads on a computer, or
exhibits any obscene material or child pornography ... shall be guilty, upon conviction, of
a felony. 63
Juvenile prosecution for self-produced child pornography has only recently
garnered significant attention.64 However, there is appellate authority upholding a state's
power to punish minors under child pornography laws for producing images of
themselves.65 In A.H. v. State, a Florida appellate court determined A.H.'s privacy rights
were not violated when prosecuted for self-produced child pornography. 66 She faced
prosecution for sending naked pictures over the internet to her boyfriend depicting sexual
acts between them; she was sixteen, he was seventeen. 67 The defendant, A.H., argued
that because the Florida Supreme Court had ruled sexual conduct between minors
evoked constitutionally protected privacy rights under the Florida Constitution, 68
pictures of teenagers engaging in the same conduct sent over the internet warranted
similar protection. 69
The court distinguished dissemination of sexually explicit pictures from sexual
conduct, stating the pictures were prone to dissemination among many people and could
lead to the minors' commercial exploitation. The court noted constitutionally protected
privacy rights depended on a reasonable privacy expectation. 7 1 Minors engaging in
documented immature sexually active relationships 72 had no reasonable expectation that
the sexually explicit photographs would remain discreet. 73 For this reason, the court
concluded the state's compelling interest in preventing sexually explicit transmissions
warranted the minor's prosecution. 74
The dissent of A.H. discussed potential flaws in the court's reasoning. 75 The
court's premise rested on the belief that the minor's prosecution under the Florida child

2009); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 61-8C-3 (West 2009); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 948.12 (2009); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 64-303 (West 2009)).
62. Smith, supra note 60, at 513.
63. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 1021.2 (West 2009) (emphasis added).
64. Smith, supra note 60, at 513.
65. Id. (citing A.H. v. State, 949 So. 2d 234, 239 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2007)).
66. A.H., 949 So. 2d at 235.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 236 (citing B.B. v. State, 659 So.2d 256, 260 (Fla. 1995)) (holding that although sexual abstinence
is a worthy educational tool, teenage sexual activity is not worthy of second degree felony prosecution as it is
constitutionally protected under privacy rights).
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. A.H., 949 So. 2d at 236 (citing Bd. of Cnty. Comm'rs of Palm Beach Cnty. v. D.B.,, 184 So.2d 585, 588
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2001)).
72. Id. at 237.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 238-39.
75. Id. at 239.
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pornography statute ultimately protected her from abuse. 76 However, the dissent noted
the purported purpose of the statute was protection for minors; 77 in this case, the
statute's effect was the protected class' punishment. The dissenting opinion did not
distinguish between minors engaging in sexual conduct and minors engaging in
documented sexual conduct. 79 The court's decision to distinguish these two actions
rested on multiple unsubstantiated conclusions, such as speculations concerning the
ultimate demise of the romantic relationship and the inevitable dissemination of the
photographs to third parties.80 The dissent emphasized the minor's intent as the
controlling factor in prosecution. 8 1 Because an intention to disseminate the photographs
to third parties did not exist, 82 her right to privacy was reasonable, and thus should have
been constitutionally protected. 83
C.

The Rise of "Sexting"

Currently, four out of five teens possess a wireless device, 84 which is a fortypercent increase since 2004.85 Nearly half of teens believe their social lives would vanish
without their cell phones, and nearly sixty percent state their cell phones improve their
quality of life. 86 Thirty-nine percent of teens send or receive text messages, 87 and admit
to taking and sending pictures via text.
Sexting, a side effect of the sudden explosion in cell phone usage, leaves parents,
teachers, and lawmakers in an unprecedented position.89 Confronted with this new
technological phenomenon, law enforcement officers filed criminal charges against
teens for sexting in Pennsylvania, Ohio, Michigan, Alabama, Wisconsin, Florida, New
York, New Jersey, Connecticut, Texas, Utah, and other states. 9 1 In Oklahoma,
prosecutors have referred at least ten cases of self-produced child pornography to
juvenile courts but have not yet filed charges in adult courts. 92
A recent survey by The National Campaign to Prevent Teen and Unplanned
Pregnancy detailing sexting's pervasiveness 93 received much attention in light of
76. A.H., 949 So. 2d at 239 (citing FLA. STAT. ANN. § 827.071(3) (West 2007)).
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Id. at 240.
80. Id.
81. A.H. 949 So. 2d at 240.
82. Id
83. Id. at 241.
84. Cell Phones Key to Teens' Social Lives, supra note 14.
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. Caleb Johnson, Vermont Teen Going to the Slammerfor 'Sexting, 'SWITCHED.COM (Sept. 4, 2009, 1:36
PM), http://www.switched.com/2009/09/04/vernont-teen-going-to-the-slammer-for-sexting/.
90. Id. (stating that parents' and lawmakers' fears surrounding "sexting" lead to "crackdown" on
prosecution).
91. Mathias H. Heck, Jr., Sexting and Charging Juveniles-Balancing the Law and Bad Choices, 43
PROSECUTOR Jan.-Mar. 2009, at 28.
92. Barbara Hoberock, Legislator Taking Aim at Teen 'Sexting',TULSA WORLD, Oct. 30, 2009, at A13.
93. See generallySex and Tech: Results From a Survey of Teens and Young Adults, THE NAT'L. CAMPAIGN
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sexting's newfound prevalence. 94 Thirty-nine percent of the teen respondents admitted
sending or posting "sexually suggestive" images via text, email, or instant message. 95 Of
the teens that sent sexually explicit messages, seventy-one percent of females and sixtyseven percent of males sent them to their boyfriend or girlfriend.96 Seventy-five percent
of the teens believed that sending "sexually suggestive content [could] have serious
negative consequences." 97
Pennsylvania teens Marissa Miller and Grace Kelly know the truth of this
statement all too well.98 In October 2008, Tunkhannock School District officials
confiscated several student cell phones and discovered they contained pictures of female
teenage students "scantily clad, semi-nude, and nude." 99 The School District gave the
phones to George Skumanick, the District Attorney of Wyoming County,
Pennsylvania. 100 Skumanick stated publically to local newspapers and parents at a
school assembly that he could prosecute the teens under Pennsylvania's anti-child
pornography statute,101 resulting in felony convictions for the teens.102 He also warned
of probable sex offender registration for a period of at least ten years. 103
Skumanick sent letters to approximately twenty parents informing them their child
was "identified in a police investigation involving the possession . . . of child

pornography." 1 0 4 This letter promised the termination of charges if the teens entered a
six to nine month "education and counseling" program. 105 Skumanick held a meeting
with the parents at the county courthouse in February 2009, addressing the teens'
options. 106 At the meeting, Skumanick discussed the inevitability of prosecution unless
the "children submitted to probation, paid a $100 program fee and completed the
program successfully." 1 07
Parents at the meeting inquired into the nature of the photographs that warranted
prosecution.los One parent asked directly why a picture of his daughter in a swimsuit
TO

PREVENT

TEEN

AND

UNPLANNED

PREGNANCY

(2008),

available

at

http://www.thenationalcampaign.org/sextech.
94. See Sex and Tech: Selected Press, THE NAT'L. CAMPAIGN TO PREVENT TEEN AND UNPLANNED

PREGNANCY, http://www.thenationalcampaign.org/sextech/press.aspx (last accessed Oct. 17, 2009) (listing
numerous news articles, television coverage, and radio coverage discussing "sexting" and the results of this
survey).
95. Sex and Tech: Results From a Survey of Teens and Young Adults, supra note 93, at 1 (stating 1,280
people were surveyed, but only 653 of those were actually teens (ages 13-19), while the other 627 surveyed
were young adults (ages 20-26)).
96. Id. at 2.
97. Id. at 3.
98. See Miller v. Skumanick, 605 F. Supp. 2d 634 (M.D. Pa. 2009).
99. Id. at 637.
100. Id.
101. Id. (citing 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 6312 (West 2009)) (defining "prohibited sexual act" as depicting
"sexual intercourse ... masturbation, sadism, masochism, bestiality, fellatio, cunnilingus, lewd exhibition of
genitals or nudity if such nudity is depicted for the purpose of sexual stimulation or gratification of any person
who might view such depiction").
102. Id. at 638.
103. Miller, 605 F. Supp. 2d at 638 (citing "Meghan's Law," 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 9791 (West 2009)).
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. Id
108. Miller, 605 F. Supp. 2d at 638.
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justified her prosecution for possession of child pornography. 109 Skumanick replied the
girl's "provocativ[e]" pose warranted her prosecution. 1 10 When the father pressed
Skumanick to define "provocative" more precisely, he refused to discuss the matter and
"reminded the crowd he could charge all the minors that night.""' Skumanick added,
"[Tihese are the rules. If you don't like them, too bad."11 2
Skumanick's proposed "re-education program" was divided into separate boys'
and girls' programs. 1 13 The program's purported purpose was to teach young girls "how
their actions were wrong" and to "gain an understanding of what it mean[t] to be a girl in
today's society, both advantages and disadvantages."ll4 A mandatory homework
assignment included in the program's syllabus required the children to write " '[w]hat
[they] did' and '[w]hy it was wrong.' "115 Without showing the parents the allegedly
"provocative" photos, Skumanick asked every parent at the meeting to sign a form
submitting their children to probation and participation in the program.116 Only one
parent signed the form. 117 Skumanick gave the parents one week to comply with his
request before pressing charges. 118
When Marissa's and Grace's parents finally saw the picture of their daughters,
they saw an image of two thirteen year old girls "from the waist up, each wearing a
white, opaque bra." 11 9 Grace was playfully making a peace sign, and Marissa was
talking on the phone. 12 The other photo in question depicted a young girl ("Jane Doe")
with a white, opaque towel wrapped around her body "just below her breasts." 1 2 1
Despite the parents' repeated contention the photos did not depict sexual activity,
Skumanick reiterated his threat to press felony child pornography charges based on the
photos' "provocative" nature.1 22
His belief the girls "allowed themselves to be photographed" was the sole basis for
prosecution, dismissing the girls' contention they had no part in the dissemination of the
photographs.123 Eventually, all the parents succumbed to Skumanick's threats and
entered their children into the program except Marissa's, Grace's, and Jane Doe's
parents.124 These parents filed a petition for a temporary restraining order ("TRO") in
federal court to enjoin Skumanick from filing charges against their daughters, alleging
that the threatened prosecution was retaliation for exercising their First and Fourteenth

109.
110.
Ill.
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Miller, 605 F. Supp. 2d at 638.
Id.
Id. (citing the course syllabus attached as an exhibit to the complaint).
Id.
Id
Miller, 605 F. Supp. 2d at 639.
Id.
Id.
Id. The girl depicted was granted leave of court to remain anonymous. Id
Miller, 605 F. Supp. 2d at 639.
Id.
Id. at 640.
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Amendment rights in refusing to enter the "re-education" program. 125
First, the parents contended the non-obscene nature of the photographs afforded
them protection under the First Amendment.126 Second, the program's forced admission
of guilt, despite the fact the children did not violate a law, was impermissible compelled
speech.127 Lastly, the parents asserted Skumanick's program violated their parental right
to "control the upbringing of their children."l28 Since the petition was for a TRO, the
court considered whether the parents had a reasonable probability of success at trial, if
the children would suffer irreparable injury if relief was denied, the nonmoving party's
12 9
possible stake in the outcome, and the public interest in granting the relief.
The court determined the parents and children had a reasonable chance of success
130
on the merits because they sufficiently asserted constitutionally protected activities.
The program potentially infringed on the parents' right to control the upbringing and
education of their children, 131 and the program's requirement that the children write an
essay concerning how their actions "affected the victim in the case" magnified the
parental right infringement. 132 In the parents' eyes, their daughters were the "victims" as
133
they did not disseminate the photos and accordingly did not deserve this lesson.
The children demonstrated a right to be free from government-compelled
speech. 134 The program would force the children to explain the impermissible nature of
their actions.135 Because the photographs did not depict a "prohibited sexual act"l36 and
because the children were arguably the victims of the offense, as they did not
disseminate the pictures, 137 it was reasonably likely they would not face conviction for
the child pornography offense. 138 The court determined the children would suffer
irreparable harm in the event the TRO was not granted. 139 The irreparable harm was the
"chilling effect" the "threat of prosecution" had on "plaintiffs expressing themselves by
appearing in photographs, even such innocent photographs as those in bathing suits."l40
The court found the plaintiffs met their burden and granted the TRO.141
While Marissa's and Grace's ordeal was not trivial by any measure,142 Ohio teen
Jesse Logan felt sexting's repercussions much more acutely. 143 Jesse sent nude pictures
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. Miller, 605 F. Supp. 2d at 640.
128. Id.
129. Id. at 641 (citing Winter v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 129 S. Ct. 365 (2008)).
130. Id. at 644.
131. Id. (citing Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 65 (2000); Meyer v. Neb., 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923)).
132. Miller, 605 F. Supp. 2d at 644.
133. Id.
134. Id. (citing Turner Broad Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 641 (1994)).
135. Id.
136. Id. at 645 (citing 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 6312 (West 2009)).
137. Miller, 605 F. Supp. 2d at 645-46.
138. Id. at 646.
139. Id.
140. Id.
141. Id.
142. Miller, 605 F. Supp. 2d at 646 (citing the irreparable harm the threat of prosecution caused the teens).
143. Mike Celizic, Her Teen Committed Suicide Over Sexting', TODAYSHOW.COM (Mar. 6, 2009, 8:26
AM), http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/29546030.
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of herself to her boyfriend.144 When they broke up, he sent them to their female
classmates.145 The ridicule that followed turned the vivacious young girl into a
depressed and desperate teen.146 She feared the daily name-calling of "slut" and "whore"
so intensely that she became afraid to go to school and began skipping classes to avoid
the inevitable fear and embarrassment. 147 In May 2008, Jesse went on a local television
program to warn other teens about the consequences of sending nude photos to peers.148
She wanted something positive to come out of her ordeal and "to make sure no one else
[would] have to go through [her experience] again." 1 49 Two months after Jesse's
television appearance, Jesse's mother felt she was slowly returning to her old self.150
Tragically, this was not to be. 15 1 Jesse's mother found her daughter's body hanged in her
closet after attending the funeral of a fellow classmate who also committed suicide. 152
As these cases demonstrate, there is research suggesting the production of sexting
photos is more prominent among teenage girls, while the dissemination of the photos is
more prominent among teenage boys.153 One social psychologist, Dr. Arthur Cassidy,
suggests the desire of young girls to mirror the images they see in fashion magazines
coupled with the explosion of internet networking sites creates unprecedented pressure
on young girls to present themselves as sexual objects. 154 The prevalence of teen access
to camera phones creates a natural outlet for this sexual pressure. 155
D.

Recent Legislative Actions in Response to Sexting

In 2009, many states took legislative steps to amend child pornography laws in
response to sexting. 156 Lawmakers in Utah enacted legislation downgrading punishment
for sexting from a third degree felony to a misdemeanor if the person disseminating the
pornographic photographs is seventeen or younger. 157 Nebraska now affords an
affirmative defense to minors in possession of sexually explicit images of children
fifteen and older provided the images depict only one child, coercion did not produce the
pictures, and dissemination of the photographs did not occur.158
Specifically citing the recent Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act
("SORNA") requiring substantial implementation by every state at the risk of losing
144. Id.
145. Id
146. Id
147. Id.
148. Celizic, supranote 143.
149. Id
150. Id
151. Id.
152. Id
153. Annalisa Barbieri, You Don't Know What Sexting Is?, THE GUARDIAN, (Aug. 7, 2009),
http://www.guardian.co.uk/lifeandstyle/2009/aug/07/sexting-teenagers-mobile-phones.
154. Id.
155. Cell PhonesKey to Teens' Social Lives, supra note 14.
156. Pam Greenberg, Internet andInformation Technology: States Act to Address 'Sexting, NAT'L CONF. OF
STATE LEGISLATURES,, http://www.ncsl.org/?tabid=17822 (last accessed Nov. 1, 2009) (additionally discussing
new legislation aimed at reaching adults luring minors through "sexting.")
157. H.B. 97, 2009 Gen. Sess. (Utah 2009).
158. Internet and Information Technology: States Act to Address 'Sexting', supra note 156 (citing Leg. 97,
101st Leg., Ist Reg. Sess. (Neb. 2009)).
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funding, 159 Vermont moved minor adjudication for sexting to juvenile court to avoid sex
offender registration. 160 The Vermont legislation also decriminalized minor possession
of images of other minors, as long as the possessor attempted to destroy the image and
did not send it to others. 161 Ohio introduced similar legislation, creating a misdemeanor
offense for minors convicted of sexting.162 The law states, "[n]o minor, by use of a
telecommunications device, shall recklessly create, receive, exchange, send, or possess a
photograph, video, or other material that shows a minor in a state of nudity." 163 While
Oklahoma has not yet enacted legislation addressing sexting, a hearing held in October
of 2009 discussed the possible ramifications of sexting and the need for parental
awareness and possible legislative change.1 64
III. ANALYSIS
A.

Sexting Offenses Violate Statutory Intent of ChildPornographyStatutes

The recent rise of sexting among teenagers is a serious issue underscoring
disturbing developments in the lives of teenagers.165 The relevant question is whether
the severe punishment under current child pornography laws,166 enacted in response to
is an appropriate response to teen-produced
specific egregious acts of child abuse,
sexual images sent to a significant other of similar age and maturity.168 When first
confronted with the rapidly growing child pornography industry,1 69 Congress noted its
intent in enacting legislation confronting this disturbing phenomenon was counteraction
of the "commercial exploitation" of minors, not the private conduct of "consenting
minors or consenting adults." 1 70
After the Supreme Court in Ferberapproved a more expansive definition of child
pornography than obscenity,171 Congress greatly expanded its child pornography
legislation.172 The deletion of the term "commercial purpose" allowed for prosecution of
producers who did not have commercial intentions. 173 Congress expanded the amount of
teen sexting images that warrant prosecution by raising the age of the protection under
the Act from sixteen to eighteen. 174 The amendment's intention was not expansion of

159. 42 U.S.C.A §§ 16901-16917 (West 2006).
160. Sen. 125, 2009 Reg. Sess. I (Vt. 2009).
161. Id. at 6.
162. S. 103, 128th Gen. Assemb., 2009-2010 Reg. Sess. (Ohio 2009); H. 132, 128th Gen. Assemb., 20092010 Reg. Sess. (Ohio 2009).
163. Id.
164. Hoberock, supra note 92, at All
165. Smith, supra note 60,, at 515.
166. Id.
167. Buckman, supra note 18, at 543 (citing S.. REP. No. 95-438, at 5).
168. Smith, supra note 60,, at 515-16.
169: Buckman, supra note 18, at 543.
170. 95 CONG. REc. H139 (emphasis added).
171. N.Y. v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 758 (1982).
172. H.R. REP. No. 98-536 at 492-94.
173. Id. at 493-94.
174. Id. at 496.
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protection to older teens, 17 5 but merely facilitation of adult prosecutions, made difficult
under the previous Act by the requirement of proving the age of an often-absent subject
as sixteen or under. 176
While Congress accomplished its goal of raising child pornography
prosecutions 1 77 it could not have intended the Act, and state laws modeled after it,178 to
facilitate the prosecution of self-produced teen sexting images. 179 However, because the
Act raised the age of protection to encompass images of older teens as well as younger
teens, the overall pool of teens vulnerable to prosecution for voluntary, self-produced
images expanded as well.180 Furthermore, in sexting cases the minor charged with
production of the image is also the subject of the image, and therefore is obviously
present throughout the proceedings.181 Thus, Congress' reasons for raising the age of
protection do not translate to sexting prosecutions of minors.182
After given the authority to expand the definition of child pornography, 183
Congress specifically cited situations where the subject of the images and the producer of
the images were separate individuals, as the impetus for increasing protection under the
Act.184 The Court also referenced the harmful effects of the production of child
pornography at the hands of an adult in striking down the Act's inclusion of virtual
images.185 Because the process of producing virtual child pornography did not harm any
children,186 the First Amendment shielded the virtual images from prosecution. 187
Therefore, unless coerced into producing a sexting image, teen prosecution for
production of the image is unwarranted.188 The Court in Free Speech Coalition further
distinguished the production of harmful images from the production of images depicting
an idea embodying a "fact of modem society and .. . a theme in art and literature
175. Id. at 505 (explaining the Act would most likely not reach images of eighteen year olds due to the
difficulty in proving the age of the subjects, but would merely facilitate prosecution of images of children
sixteen and younger).
176. Id.
177. 134 CONG. REC. E3750 (stating prosecution of child pornography rose 600 percent in response to the
expansion of the Act).
178. See supra note 61 (citing all fifty states' child pornography laws, most of which passed after the federal
laws criminalizing child pornography, and nearly all listing eighteen as the age of protection).
179. See 134 CONG. REc. E3750.. By raising the age of protection to eighteen, the amount of teens covered
by the Act expanded to enable prosecution for older teens as well as younger teens. See id.
180. See H.R. REP. No. 98-536. By raising the age of protection to eighteen, the amount of teens covered by
the Act expanded to enable prosecution for older teens as well as younger teens.
181. See id. at 494(stating under the pre-amendment Act prosecutors had to prove to the jury the age of the
subject was sixteen or less because the subject was generally not known or locatable due to the images'
commercial nature).
182. See Miller v. Skumanick, 605 F. Supp. 2d 634, 639 (M.D. Pa. 2009) (describing images produced by
the teen girls).
183. See N.Y. v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 761(1982) (citing Miller v. Cal., 413 U.S. 15, 24-55 (1973))
(explaining a broader definition of obscenity is warranted for minors due to the physical and psychological
abuse attributed to child pornography produced at the hand of an adult).
184. H.R. REP. No. 98-536, at 492 (stating children filmed engaging in sexual acts "for the producer's own
pleasure or profit" was a "national tragedy").
185. Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coal., 535 U.S. 234, 241-2 (2002).
186. Id.
187. Id. at 258.
188. See Miller v. Skumanic, 605 F. Supp. 2d 634 (M.D. Pa. 2009). None of the teen images found on the
teenagers' phones were described as "coerced." Id.; See Celizic, supra note 143. Jesse voluntarily produced the
images she sent to her boyfriend. Id.
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throughout the ages," the idea of "teenagers engaging in sexual activity."1 89
The Court emphasized most states allow marriage below the age of eighteen, thus
the Act criminalized the depiction of an act which, when consensual, was legal in most
states.1 90 Because the virtual images "creat[ed] no victim by [their] production," they
were not intertwined with the "sexual abuse of children," and thus constitutionally
protected.191 Similarly, the dissemination of sexting images, not their voluntary
production, is what victimizes the teen subjects;192 therefore, the First Amendment
shields teens from criminal prosecution for merely producing the images.1 93 When
sexting images are not obscene, as the images in Miller, the First Amendment
indisputably provides protection as their production is legal. 194
B.

The State's Purpose in ChargingTeens for ProducingSexting Images

Exploring the state's reasoning behind teen prosecution for child pornography
offenses is imperative, as the purpose is not mitigating harm caused to children through
the production of child pornography by adult coercion. 195 In recent years, extensive
"advocacy, funding, and programmatic effort have focused on encouraging Americans to
abstain from sexual intercourse until they marry." 1 96 The Personal Responsibility and
Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act ("Welfare Reform Act"), enacted in 1996,
authorized fifty million dollars a year for abstinence-until-marriage education. 197 The
education programs endorsed by the Welfare Reform Act had to promote sexual
abstinence outside of marriage as their sole purpose.198 Congress required programs
funded by the Welfare Reform Act teach that pre-marital sex created detrimental
physical and psychological effects in its participants. 199
These programs sought to reduce teen sexual activity in response to the reported
seventy percent of females, and sixty-five percent of males, engaging in sexual activity
by age nineteen.200 Despite opinion polls that registered only thirty-five percent of adults
189. FreeSpeech Coal., 535 U.S. at 246.
190. Id. at 247.
191. Id. at 250 (emphasis added).
192. Sed Celizic, supra note 143 (Jesse did not suffer embarrassment and the resulting depression from the
production of the images, but the dissemination of the images to her classmates); see Miller, 605 F. Supp. 2d at
644. The court granted the TRO in part due to parents' belief their daughters were made "victims" by the
dissemination of the photographs, not the production; especially in light of the non-obscene nature of the
photographs. Id
193. See Free Speech Coal., 535 U.S. at 250-1. The abusive production of the images was emphasized by
the Court. Id.
194. See Miller, 605 F. Supp. 2d at 645 (citing 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 6312) (defining "prohibited
sexual act" as depicting "sexual intercourse . . . masturbation, sadism, masochism, bestiality, fellatio,
cunnilingus, lewd exhibition of genitals or nudity if such nudity is depicted for the purpose of sexual
stimulation or gratification of any person who might view such depiction").
195. See supra notes 165-194 and accompanying text (demonstrating prosecution of teens for producing
sexting images violates the statutes' intent, as the intent is to mitigate the child abuse that results from child
pornography produced by adults).
196. Lawrence B. Finer, Trends in PremaritalSex in the United States, 1954-2003, 122 PUB. HEALTH RPT.
Jan.-Feb. 2007, at73, 74.
197. Id at 74 (citing Pub. L. No. 104-193, § 912, 110 Stat. 2105 (1996)).
198. Id.
199. Id
200. Id
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felt premarital sex was always or almost always wrong, Congress continued to promote
its single-minded intent to abolish all pre-marital sex as immoral and wrong.201
The internet and technology explosion of the late nineties made policing teen
interactions increasingly difficult. 202 Approximately eighty-seven percent of teens use
the internet and sixty-four percent of those teens belong to social networking sites or
blogs on which they post pictures of themselves.203 Teens tend to use the invisible wall
created by technology between the sender and recipient as a means to experiment with
their sexuality.204 Sexting embodies this desire to experiment sexually,205 and
accordingly frustrates Congress' desire to condemn all sexual activities outside of
marriage as morally unacceptable.206 By prosecuting teens for sexting, states are
furthering the belief that sexual interaction among teens is wrong.207 This takes
advantage of a veritable "loop hole" in child pornography laws enabling regulation of the
increasingly private technological interactions among teens. 208
C.

Alternatives to Criminal Charges

Charging teens with child pornography offenses for the production of sexting
images serves to victimize them, not protect them. 209 Because the intent of child
pornography laws is protection of inexperienced and vulnerable minors from sexual
exploitation,210 it is important to teach children the dangers of sexual exploitation, rather
than punish them for sexual experimentation.211 The topic of sex education invites
political discourse surrounding the proper role of the government versus the family in
educating teens about sexual issues.212 However, as sexting demonstrates, it is
indisputable that teens are involved in sexual interactions.213 Therefore, sex education
regarding both moral implications and health concerns is required.214
As Miller suggests, parents, not the state, are the preferred instructors for education

201. Finer, supra note 196, at 74.
202. See Caitlin May, Comment, "Internet-Savvy Students" and Bewildered Educators: Student Internet
Speech Is CreatingLegal Issuesfor the EducationalCommunity, 58 CATH. U. L. REV. 1105, 1106 (explaining
the surge in legal issues concerning "student internet speech").
203. Id. at 1105.
204. See Bruce Bower, Growing Up Online: Young People Jump Headfirst into the Internet's World, 179
Sci. NEWS, June 17, 2006, at 376, 377 (June 17, 2006) (discussing teen inclination to talk about sexual issues in
chat rooms).
205. See id. (explaining technology's role in promoting sexual expression among teens). "Sexting" is an
extension of the feeling of anonymity and excitement teens feel when discussing sex in chat rooms. See id
206. Finer, supra note 196, at 74.
207. See id
208. See OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 1021. This statute is typical of the vast majority of child pornography
statutes in stating every person in possession of child pornography is guilty of a felony. Id (emphasis added).
209. See A.H. v. State, 949 So. 2d 234, 239 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2007) (Padovano, J., dissenting).
210. See S. REP. NO. 95-438, at 5.
211. See Ronny A. Shtarkshall, John S. Santelli & Jennifer S. Hirsch, Sex Education and Sexual
Socialization: Roles for Educators and Parents, 39 PERSP. ON SEXUAL AND REPROD. HEALTH, June 2007, at
116, 116 (explaining the important role sexual education and socialization plays in a child's upbringing).
212. Id
213. See Smith, supra note 60, at 508-9 (discussing the issues surrounding teen-produced child pornography
and the prevalence of teens sexual interactions).
214. See Shtarkshall et al., supranote 211,, at 116.
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concerning the moral implications surrounding sexual interactions.215 "Sexual
socialization," in contrast to sexual education, concerns the learning of beliefs, norms,
values, and proper codes of conduct surrounding sexual interactions.216 Children model
their sexual behavior after the sexual ideals and beliefs taught to them informally in their
home environment.217 Teens who describe their relationships with their parents as
"warm and supportive" tend to postpone sexual interactions. 2 18 Further, teens whose
parents disapprove of teen sexual behavior are less likely to be sexually active. 2 19
Ideally, the home should be the primary source of education concerning sexual
mores and conduct.220 However, as technology and mass media continue to rise in
popularity, teens are looking to other outlets for models of appropriate sexual
behavior.221 Sexting is a glaring example of this. 222 As Dr. Cassidy suggests, teen girls
especially look to the sexual images portrayed by the media as models for their sexual
behavior.223 Sexting is a wake-up call to parents to resume their rightful place as the
appropriate models of sexual conduct and to become more active in their teens' lives. 224
The most obvious outlet through which parents can deter the rise of sexting is to
limit the usage of their teens' cell phones. 2 Most major cell phone providers offer tools
that allow parents to either limit the amount of texts teens are able to send, or to monitor
the content of such communication at a minimal cost.226 While these tools can deter the
conduct by instilling fear of parental punishment,227 open communication and positive
familial models concerning appropriate sexual behavior is preferable. 228
Besides the prevalence of the media,229 another impediment to teen education
within the home environment concerning sexual behavior is the discomfort felt by teens
at the thought of discussing sex with their parents.230 Parents, especially fathers, share
this sentiment.231 This mutual feeling of unease bolsters the need for sex education in
schools.232 A school's prominent role in regulating sexting offenses also magnifies the
need for continued diligence by school administrators concerning sex education.233 The
215. Miller v. Skumanic, 605 F. Supp. 2d 634, 644 (M.D. Pa. 2009).
216. Shtarkshall et al., supra note 211, at 116.
217. Id.
218. Id. at117.
219. Id.
220. Id. at116.
221. Shtarkshall et al., supra note 211, at 116.
222. See supra notes 202-8 and accompanying text (describing the impact the technological explosion has
had on regulating teen interactions).
223. See Barbieri, supra note 153.
224. See Shtarkshall et al., supra note 211, at 117 (explaining that teens who have close relationships with
their parents are less likely to be sexually active).
225. See Parental Controls on Cell Phones, SPAM LAWS, http://www.spamlaws.com/parental-cell-phonecontrol.html (last accessed Nov. 14, 2009).
226. Id. (citing sexting as an impetus behind these tools).
227. Id. (stating the purpose of these tools is to monitor teen behavior). Presumably, the purpose of the
monitoring is to be able to punish the teens in the event sexual images are found. Id.
228. See Shtarkshall et al., supra note 211, at 116.
229. See Barbieri, supra note 153.
230. See Shtarkshall et al., supranote 211, at 117.
231. Id.
232. Id.
233. See Miller v. Skumanic, 605 F. Supp. 2d 634, 637 (M.D. Pa. 2009) (stating the pictures at issue were all
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need for familial education concerning the subjective moral implications of sexual
interactions, and the need for school education of the objective health risks, demonstrates
a shared obligation between parents and schools.234 Criminal punishment of teens for
sexting is an ineffective and inappropriate method to teach socially acceptable sexual
behavior compared to education by parents and teachers. 23 5 Therefore, the state should
concede sex education to parents and schools and focus on punishing adults who exploit
minors, the intended perpetrators of child pornography laws. 236
This is not to say law enforcement should play no role in mitigating sexting.237
The need for parental and school involvement as opposed to criminal charges pertains
solely to teens that voluntarily produce images of themselves and disseminate them to a
single person.238 Threatening criminal charges is completely appropriate to convince
teens to desist from sending the sexually explicit images to multiple individuals. 239 For
example, teens such as Jesse Logan's boyfriend are entirely worthy of criminal
punishment, but Jesse herself most certainly was not. 240
Law enforcement can deter sexting by educating teens about the possible criminal
sanctions involved in sexting.241 As Ohio prosecutor Mathias Heck explains, most teens
that produce and send sexting messages simply are unaware of the criminal
repercussions surrounding their decisions.242 In March of 2009, Heck's county
introduced a program specifically aimed at juvenile sexting offenders. 243 The six-month
"diversion program" requires teen participants of sexting to relinquish their cell phones,
participate in community service, and take four hours of educational courses concerning
the appropriate and legal use of the internet and related topics.244 While programs such
as these are a welcome alternative to criminal charges, prosecutors must take into
account the lessons learned from Miller.245 These programs must focus on the legal
ramifications of sexting and not the state's beliefs concerning the appropriateness of
gender roles and teen sex. 24 6 Due to the paternalistic motives behind teen sexting
charges247 and the need for parental and educational responsibility in response to the

confiscated from cell phones at school); see May, supra note 202, at 1106-7 (describing the implications of the
increased presence of internet communications on school campuses).
234. Shtarkshall et al., supra note 211, at 117.
235. See Eric J. Segall, Internet Indecency and Minors: The Casefor Parentaland School Responsibility Not
Congressional Regulation, 110 PENN ST. L. REV. 615 (2006).
236. See supra notes 165-194 and accompanying text (describing child pornography laws' intended purpose
was punishment of adults who exploit minors).
237. Smith, supra note 60, at 541.
238. See id. at 541-542 (discussing the need for criminal punishment only those teens that refuse to
cooperate with law enforcement in destroying the images).
239. Id.
240. See Celizic, supra note 143.
241. See Heck, supra note 91, at 29.
242. Id.
243. Id
244. Id.
245. See Miller v. Skumanic, 605 F. Supp. 2d 634, 643-4 (M.D. Pa. 2009) (stating the "re-education"
program impermissibly infringed on parental rights to educate their children).
246. See id.
247. See supra notes 195-208 and accompanying text (explaining the government's intentions in charging
teens for sexting is mitigation of pre-marital sex, not child abuse).
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249
sexting phenomenon,248 state child pornography laws require amendment.

D.

SORNA's Effect on Convictions of Minors
1.

SORNA's Expansive Reach

The recent enactment of SORNA, the national sex offender registry, 2 50 bolsters the
need for legislative change to state child pornography laws. 25 1 John Walsh, an
invaluable advocate for missing children and unsolved crime, has orchestrated the
enactment of numerous laws aimed at child protection and sex offender registry.252 One
example of this activism, The Adam Walsh Child Protection and Safety Act, became
federal law on July 27, 2006.253 Additionally, this came with its most controversial and
significant provisions, SORNA. 254
Initially, all fifty states were individually required under SORNA to implement
procedures creating a national sex offender registry by July 27, 2009, or lose ten percent
of its allocated Byrne Justice Assistance Grant funds255 for each year it did not
comply.256 On May 26, 2009, the Attorney General granted a blanket extension to all
jurisdictions for substantial implementation of the terms of SORNA until July 27,
2010.257 As of October 2009, Ohio and the Confederated Tribes of the Umatilla Indian
Reservation (located in Oregon) were the only two jurisdictions in substantial
compliance with SORNA.258 Upon this bill's signature in 2006, President Bush
259
explained the necessity for compiling a public national database of sex offenders.
Such a database enabled "parents to protect their children from sex offenders that might
be in their neighborhoods" when these offenders moved across state lines. 260
Despite the implementation costs for states, and the already existing sex offender
registry statutes, states are required to impose these restrictions at the risk of losing
necessary funding.261 SORNA creates a national sex offender registry by implementing
a three-tiered system of classification for offenders who are required to register.262 Tier I

248. See supranotes 210-34 and accompanying text (describing the parental and educational alternatives that
could mitigate sexting).
249. See supra notes 60-5 and accompanying text (stating the vast majority of child pornography laws
contain language broad enough to encompass sexting offenses, therefore amendment is necessary).
250. 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 16901-16917.
251. See Smith, supra note 60, at 536.
252. Anthony V. Salerno & Elana Goldstein, Predators' Net: Implementation of the Adam Walsh Act Raises
Fundamental Questions of Constitutional Rights, L.A. LAWYER, June 2009, at 32.
253. 42 U.S.C.A § 16901.
254. Salerno & Goldstein, supra note 252, at 32 (citing 42 U.S.C.A §§ 16901-16917).
255. Id. (explaining these grants generally apply to law enforcement and drug laws).
256. Id.
257. Adam Walsh Child Protection and Safety Act, NAT'L CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES,
http://www.ncsl.org/default.aspxtabid=12696 (last updated Sept. 30, 2009).
258. Id.

259. Presidential Statement on Signing the Adam Walsh Child Protection and Safety Act of 2006, 2006
U.S.C.C.A.N. S35, S36 (July 27, 2006).
260. Id.
261. Salerno & Goldstein, supra note 252, at 32.
262. Id. (citing Pub. L. No. 109-248, § 111, 120 Stat. 587, 591 (2006)).
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offenders are the least offensive sex offenders. 263 The term Tier I offenders are merely
defined as those offenders that are neither Tier II nor Tier III, and are required to register
for fifteen years, with renewal once per year.264 Tier II offenders are generally felons
convicted of numerous sexual offenses, including production and distribution of child
pornography.265 These offenders must register for twenty-five years, with renewal every
six months. 266 Tier III offenders are the most serious of the sexual offenders convicted
of the most egregious sexual offenses.267 Also included in this category are repeat Tier II
offenders.268 Tier III offenders are required to register for life at a renewal rate of every
three months. 269
Section 111 of AWA details the applicability of SORNA's sex offender
registration to juvenile offenders adjudicated delinquent of a sex offense.270 This section
mandates that juvenile offenders, who are fourteen years or older at the time of
conviction of an offense "comparable to or more severe than aggravated sexual
abuse, ... or [who have] [attempted] or [conspired] to commit such an offense," are
required to register as sex offenders. 27 1
Although at first glance it does not appear AWA includes juveniles found
delinquent for possession or dissemination of child pornography, AWA allows states
considerable leeway in determining who will be required to register. 272 Additionally, this
discretion can affect minors charged with sex offenses by altering state laws pertaining to
juvenile documents.273 These guidelines set the minimum requirements a state must
follow, meaning states can use this federal law to expand registry laws they already have
in place.274 Furthermore, the pressure placed on states to adopt these guidelines at the
risk of losing funding275 compromises the privacy of juvenile records. 2 76
Additionally, there is no assurance to minors that juvenile court is the proper venue
for charges brought against them. 277 Furthermore, even if charges are initially filed in
juvenile court, minors can find themselves transferred to criminal court during the

263. Id.
264. Id.
265. Id. at 33 (citing Pub. L. No. 109-248, § 111).
266. Salerno & Goldstein, supra note 252, at 33 (citing Pub. L. No. 109-248, § 111).
267. Id. (citing Pub. L. No. 109-248, § 111) (describing tier three offenders as offenders generally convicted
of an offense comparable to aggravated sexual abuse, sexual abuse, or abusive sexual contact against a minor
under age 13).
268. Id. (citing Pub. L. No. 109-248, § 111).
269. Id. (citing Pub. L. No. 109-248, § 111).
270. Juvenile Offenders Required to Register Under SORNA: A Fact Sheet, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE,
http://www.ojp.gov/smart/pdfs/factsheet-sornajuvenile.pdf (last accessed Sept. 24, 2009).
27 1. Id.
272. Id. The provisions expand already existing state sex offender registry laws by superseding previous
state laws that may have more rigid guidelines for defining who will be required to register. Id.
273. Id. (stating an offense need only be "comparable to" an offense of "aggravated sexual abuse").
274. Id. These standards are being imposed on states, and could have the effect of broadening a state's
previously restrictive statutes concerning who is required to register as a sex offender. Id.
275. Salerno & Goldstein, supranote 252, at 32.
276. See Martha T. Moore, Sex Crimes Break the Lock on Juvenile Records, USATODAY.COM,
http://www.yellodyno.com/pdflJuvenileSex Offenders USATODAY.pdf (last updated July 10, 2006, 10:57
PM) (explaining how national law making failure to register a felony (SORNA) will override state laws that
attempt to shield juvenile records from the public).
277. Smith, supra note 60, at 533-4.
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duration of their proceedings. 278 In both state and federal courts, prosecutors have the
option to request a removal from juvenile court to criminal court, and some states can
avoid juvenile court entirely by initially filing charges against minors in criminal
court. 2 79 If criminal court is the chosen venue for minors charged with sexting offenses,
280
SORNA's provisions will make sex offender registration mandatory for such teens.
As discussed previously, the overwhelming majority of state child pornography laws
proscribe felony charges to any person in possession of child pornography; 2 81 thus under
SORNA, minors convicted in criminal court for sexting offenses would be required to
282
register for a minimum of twenty-five years as sex offenders.
Many circuit court opinions have addressed the constitutionality of 18 U.S.C. §
2250(a), which makes it a felony to fail to register as a sex offender as defined by
SORNA.283 The Attorney General was delegated the task of determining SORNA's
284
retroactive application to offenders convicted before the statute's effective date.
However, no guidelines accompanied the implementation of this decision.285 The
Attorney General determined the requirements of SORNA applied to "all sex offenders,
including sex offenders convicted of the offense for which registration is required prior
to the enactment of [the] Act." 286
Prior to September 2009, all circuit courts had rejected claims that the provision

278. Id
279. Id at 534 (citing 18 U.S.C.A. §5032 (West 1996) ("granting federal district court judges broad
discretion, in the interests of justice, to allow juveniles to be prosecuted as adults in federal court")); see
National Overviews: Which States Try Juveniles as Adults and Use Blended Sentencing?, NAT'L CTR. FOR
JUVENILE JUSTICE, http://www.ncjj.org/stateprofiles (select "Trying and Sentencing Juveniles as Adults" in the
"National Overviews" drop down box; then select the hyperlink for the article) (last accessed Nov. 20, 2009)
(stating, "Thirty-eight states allow for the possibility that minors will be prosecuted as adults on any felony
charge; twenty of those go even farther, permitting minors to be prosecuted in criminal court for misdemeanors
as well).
280. Pub. L. No. 109-248, § Ill (persons convicted of felony child pornography convictions are Tier II
offenders).
281. See supra note 61 (listing state child pornography laws which proscribe felony charges to any person
convicted of possession of child pornography).
282. Pub. L. No. 109-248, § 111.
283. Corey Rayburn Yung, One of These Laws is Not Like the Others: Why the Federal Sex Offender
Registry andNotification Act Raises New ConstitutionalQuestions, 46 HARV. J. ON LEGIs. 369, 384-5 (2009)
(citing 18 U.S.C.A. § 2250 (West 2006); U. S. v. Dixon, 551 F.3d 578, 586-587 (7th Cir. 2008) (holding
defendant was required to register in Indiana even though Indiana had not established the SORNA procedures,
Congress did not violate separation of powers when it delegated to the Attorney General authority to specify
SORNA's applicability, defendant's conviction did not violate due process, and defendant's second conviction
did not violate Ex Post Facto Clause); U.S. v. May, 535 F.3d 912, 920 (8th Cir. 2008) (holding registration
requirements applied to defendant and this did not violate Ex Post Facto Clause, defendant lacked standing to
challenge SORNA provision giving authority to the Attorney General to promulgate rules regarding SORNA,
his conviction did not violate due process, and SORNA did not violate the Commerce Clause) (8th Circuit
subsequently affirmed its judgment in May and found § 16913 constitutional under the Commerce Clause in
U.S. v. Howell, 552 F.3d 1329 (8th Cir. 2009)); U.S. v. Hinkley, 550 F.3d 926, 940 (10th Cir. 2008) (holding
SORNA did apply to defendant, SORNA did not violate Ex Post Facto Clause or the Commerce Clause); U.S.
v. Ambert, 561 F.3d 1202, 1215 (11th Cir. 2009) (holding the application of the provisions making it a crime
not to register under SORNA did not violate the Ex Post Facto provision of the Constitution, did not violate
defendant's substantive or procedural due process rights, SORNA did not exceed Congress' authority under the
Commerce Clause, and the provision giving the Attorney General the authority to determine the retroactive
application of the Act was not an improper delegation of legislative authority)).
284. 42 U.S.C.A. § 16913(d).
285. Yung, supra note 283, at 382.
286. U.S. v. Juvenile Male, 581 F.3d 977, 982 (9th Cir. 2009) (citing 28 C.F.R. § 72.3 (2007)).
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violated the Ex Post Facto Clause of the Constitution. 287 But on September 10, 2009,
deciding an issue of first impression, the Ninth Circuit determined the retroactive
application of SORNA's provision concerning juvenile registration of convictions prior
to SORNA's passage,288 was an impermissible violation of the Ex Post Facto Clause. 289
The opinion highlighted the reasoning behind the juvenile justice system, 290 and the farreaching implications sex offender registry imposed on juveniles for the entirety of their
adult lives.291 SORNA's recent addition intensified these far-reaching implications by
broadening previously discreet state and federal juvenile proceedings. 292
The court stated, "[a]s a society, we generally refuse to punish our nation's youth
as harshly as we do our fellow adults, or to hold them to the same level of culpability as
people who are older, wiser, and more mature."293 It determined the statute's effect was
punitive when applied retroactively to juveniles. 294 The practice of near absolute
confidentiality that historically attached to juvenile proceedings, 2 95 in which the
proceedings were generally closed and records sealed,296 weighed heavily on the court's
determination that SORNA's effects were punitive.297 This was because the hallmark of
juvenile proceedings was rehabilitation, as opposed to the punitive nature of adult
criminal proceedings. 29 8
Before SORNA's passage, open juvenile proceedings or released documents,
which were sparse,299 could not publicly disclose the juvenile's "identity" or
"image." 300 SORNA did not merely make previously public information more accessible
287. See Yung, supra note 283. In reaching this conclusion, the circuit courts relied on Smith v. Doe, 538
U.S. 84 (2004) where the Supreme Court found the Alaska sex offender registration and notification law did
not violate the Ex Post Facto Clause. Id at 105-6. The statute in question was indisputably retroactive, as it
applied to sex offenders convicted before the statute's enactment. Id. at 91. However, a statute of this kind only
violated the Ex Post Facto Clause if the legislature intended to punish, and not merely to establish "civil
proceedings." Id. at 92 (quoting Ks. v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 361 (1997)). If the legislature's intent was
found to impose a civil regulatory system, the statute required further examination to determine whether the
scheme was " 'so punitive either in purpose or effect as to negate [the state's] intention' to deem it 'civil.' " Id
at 92 (quoting U.S. v. Ward, 448 U.S. 242, 248-249 (1980)). The Court noted "only the clearest proof' would
counteract legislative intent and deem a statute's intended purpose morphed from a "civil remedy into a
criminal penalty." Id. at 92 (citing Hudson v. U.S., 522 U.S. 93, 100 (1997) (quoting Ward, 448 U.S. at 249));
see also Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 361; U.S. v. Ursery, 518 U.S. 267, 290 (1996); U.S. v. One Assortment of 89
Firearms, 465 U.S. 354, 365 (1984). In finding the statute was not punitive in effect, the Court relied upon the
statute's "rational connection to a nonpunitive purpose." Smith, 538 U.S. at 102 (citing Ursery, 518 U.S. at
290). In this case, the purpose was to further public safety through alerting the public of sex offenders in their
neighborhoods, especially in light of the reportedly high rate of recidivism among sex offenders and their
overall "dangerousness as a class." Id. at 103.
288. Juvenile Male, 581 F.3d at 979.
289. Id.
290. Id. at 978.
291. Id. at 979.
292. Id.
293. Juvenile Male, 581 F.3d at 978.
294. Id. at 979.
295. Id. at 983-4.
296. Id. at 986 (citing district judge at juvenile's revocation hearing stating, "[T]his is a juvenile proceeding.
Consequently, it is closed to the public.").
297. Id at 988.
298. Juvenile Male, 581 F.3d at 989.
299. Id. at 986.
300. Id. (emphasis omitted) (citing 18 U.S.C.A. § 5038(a) (West 2009)) (stating, "Throughout and upon the
completion of the juvenile delinquency proceeding, the records shall be safeguarded from disclosure to
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to the public.301 Rather, it made previously confidential information public, subjecting
juveniles to sex offender registry's irreparable repercussions, an injury previously
withheld from them. 3 02
2.

SORNA's Impact on Sexting Offenses

SORNA is another example of expansive moral legislation with unforeseen
consequences for minors convicted of sexting offenses.303 While the goal of creating a
national sex offender registry is necessary to allow, "parents to protect their children
from sex offenders that might be in their neighborhoods,"304 narrow tailoring is required
to ensure it does not victimize its intended protected class.305 As Juvenile Male explains,
the intent of criminal proceedings involving minors is rehabilitation, not disproportional
punishment. 306 Requiring teens to register as sex offenders for a large portion of their
adult lives for teen sexting offenses clearly punishes them for immature, sometimes
harmless, decisions made during their formative years. 30 7 Furthermore, even if teens are
adjudicated in juvenile court and therefore most likely exempt from registration, 308 their
juvenile records may become public, thus stigmatizing them long after they have reached
the age of majority and served their punishment. 309
While SORNA's intentions are worthy, its incidental consequences have proved
far-reaching.310 As Vermont has foreseen, legislative amendment at the state level is
necessary to ensure teens charged with sexting offenses are not required to register as sex
offenders.311 A federal blanket provision,312 which allows one person the ability to
decide such imperative decisions as retroactive application without so much as
guidelines, 313 is not capable of accounting for the individualized effects of sex offender
registry.314 Therefore, states must amend their child pornography laws to shield minors
charged with sexting offenses from the irreversible effects of expansive sex offender

unauthorized persons.").
301. Id. at 987.
302. Id
303. See Pub. L. No. 104-193; supra notes 195-208 and accompanying text (detailing the intentions behind
charging teens with sexting offenses).
304. 2006 U.S.C.C.A.N. at S36.
305. See supra;notes 209-11 and accompanying text; see also A.H, 949 So. 2d at 239 (Padovano, J.,
dissenting).
306. See U.S. v. Juvenile Male, 581 F.3d 977, 982 (9th Cir. 2009)., 581 F.3d at 989.
307. See Pub. L. No. 109-248, § Ill (requiring registration for twenty-five years); see Miller, 605 F. Supp.
2d 634. The teens involved in the injunction would have been in their forties by the time they were n longer
required to register as a sex offender. Id.
308. See supra notes 272-6 (explaining minors adjudicated delinquent will most likely not be required to
register for a child pornography offense).
309. See Juvenile Male, 581 F.3d at 979 (explaining that making previously private juvenile records public
serves to punish a juvenile long after they have reached adulthood and have families of their own).
3 10. See Yung, supra note 283 (detailing the numerous constitutional challenges to SORNA in the mere
three years since its enactment).
311. S. 125, Reg. Sess. (Vt. 2009) (citing SORNA's enactment as the impetus for decriminalizing teen
sexting in limited circumstances).
312. See 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 16901-16917.
313. See Juvenile Male, 581 F.3d at 982 (citing 28 C.F.R. § 72.3).
314. See id. (explaining the punitive effects retroactive application had on one man, effects the attorney
general most likely did not have in mind when he decided SORNA should be retroactive in application).
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registry laws. 3 15
D.

The Form Amendments Should Take
1.

"Romeo and Juliet" Exceptions to Statutory Rape

Charging teens with statutory rape for consensual teen sex draws numerous
similarities to teen sexting offenses. 3 16 Just as every state regulates child
pornography, 3 17 every state regulates sexual intercourse between unmarried people 3 18
below a certain age, commonly referred to as statutory rape. 3 19 Lawmakers generally
deem these individuals legally incapable of consent. 320
Initially, statutory rape laws reflected the premise that a woman's premarital
chastity was a valuable commodity worthy of legal protection.321 Accordingly, these
laws were gender specific; they only targeted male activity as criminal. 322 Modem laws
regulating consensual teen sex evolved from a desire to protect a property interest323 into
the belief that statutory rape laws necessarily regulated teen sexual behavior. 324
Lawmakers cited the many risks accompanying adolescent sexual behavior as bolstering
the necessity of these laws. 325 These risks ranged from the intangible harms surrounding
inexperienced sexual interactions, such as coercion or abuse, to tangible effects, such as
the proliferation of teen pregnancy. 326
A study published in 1992 by Professor Michael Males indicated that an
alarmingly high number of teen mothers gave birth to babies fathered by adult men. 327
The Alan Guttmacher Institute replicated this study on a larger scale, finding sixty-five
percent of teen mothers bore babies to fathers at least twenty years old.328 This study

315. See Juvenile Male, 581 F.3d at 981-982 (detailing the expansive provisions and their lasting and
punitive effects on juveniles).
316. See generally Siji A. Moore, Comment, Out of the Fire and Into the Frying Pan: GeorgiaLegislature's
Attempt to Regulate Teen Sex Through the Criminal Justice System, 52 How. L.J. 197 (2008) (discussing
Georgia's attempt to regulate consensual teen sexual interactions through criminal sanctions). States are
similarly using sexting offenses to regulate teen sexual interactions. See notes 195-208 and accompanying text.
317. Smith, supranote 60, at 513.
318. CAROLYN E. COCCA, JAILBAIT: THE POLITICS OF STATUTORY RAPE LAWS IN THE UNITED STATES 1
(2004).
319. Moore, supra note 316, at 208.
320. COCCA, supranote 318, at 1.
321. Id. at 11.
322. Id. at 9, 18-9.
323. Id. at 11.
324. Meredith Cohen, No Child Left Behind Bars: The Need to Combat Cruel and Unusual Punishment of
State Statutory Rape Law, 16 J.L. & POL'Y 717, 731 (2008); see Wendy Koch, Defining a Sex Predator,For
Life, USA TODAY, July 25, 2007, at 3A.
325. Michelle Oberman, Regulating Consensual Sex with Minors: Defining a Role for Statutory Rape, 48
BUFF. L. REV. 703, 704-5 (2000).
326. Id. at 705.
327. Id. (citing Mike Males, Adult Liaison in the "Epidemic" of "Teenage" Birth, Pregnancy and Venereal
Disease, 29 J. SEX RESEARCH 525, 527-44 (1992)).
328. COCCA, supra note 318, at 25; see also Oberman, supra note 325, at 705 (citing Jacqueline E. Darroch
et. al., Age Differences Between Sexual Partnersin the United States, 31 FAM. PLAN. PERSP. 160, 163 (1999);
Rigel Oliveri, Statutory Rape Law and Enforcement in the Wake of Welfare Reform, 52 STAN. L. REV. 463,
504-5 (2000) (stating the term "teen" is vague, and recent studies have shown nearly two-thirds of teen mothers
are eighteen or nineteen years old, and thus do not qualify as "victims" under statutory rape laws)).
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also demonstrated that often the younger the mother, the older the father. 329 Despite
subsequent studies showing nearly sixty percent of these teen mothers as eighteen or
nineteen years old with partners aged twenty-one or twenty-two, 33 0 the Alan Guttmacher
Institute findings fueled the fire for the strict enforcement of statutory rape laws. 3 3 1
Lawmakers and individuals believed a tougher stance on statutory rape prosecution, such
as heightened penalties for consensual teen sex, would lower teen pregnancy rates. 332
The concerns surrounding the moral and financial implications attributed to
rampant teen pregnancy led to legislation aimed at promoting statutory rape convictions
in the mid-nineties. 333 One year after the Alan Guttmacher findings, Congress looked to
334
As
welfare reform as a means of enticing states into enforcing statutory rape laws.
335
Congress enacted the Welfare Reform Act in 1996,336
previously mentioned,
simultaneously establishing Temporary Assistance to Needy Families (TANF), a block
grant to the states. 33 7
In addition to providing funding for educational programs positing the immoral
nature of premarital sex, 338 the Welfare Reform Act also targeted the
unacceptable
and
3 39
financial burdens and moral implications accompanying out of wedlock teen births.
Every state was required to submit its individual plan reducing illegitimate teen
pregnancy and specifically required to provide "education and training on the problem of
statutory rape." 34 0 States could potentially receive bonuses of up to twenty-five million
34 1
Shortly after the
dollars in TANF funding each year if teen pregnancy decreased.
Welfare Reform Act's passage, ten states poured millions of dollars into targeting teen
sex through increased statutory rape prosecutions, "explicitly intertwining the moral and
economic bases of statutory rape laws."342 This increased interest in statutory rape
prosecution garnered mixed reviews, 34 3 but it was not until a 2006 Georgia case, Wilson
v. State,344 that teen sex prosecution's far-reaching implications were brought into
focus. 34 5
On December 31, 2003, seventeen-year-old homecoming king Genarlow Wilson

329. COCCA, supranote 318, at 25.
330. Id.
331. Oberman, supra,note 325, at 706.
332. COCCA, supranote 318, at 25.
333. Id. at 26.
334. Id.
335. See supra notes 196-201 and accompanying text (explaining the Welfare Reform Act's connection to
the purpose of "sexting" charges).
336. COCCA, supranote 318, at 26 (citing Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act
of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-193, 110 Stat. 2105).
337. Id. (citing §§ 101-1 16).
338. Finer, supra note 196, at 74.
339. COCCA, supra note 318, at 26.
340. Id. (quoting §§ 402(a)(1)(A)(v), 402(a)(1)(A)(vi), 110 Stat. 2105).
341. Id. (citing §§ 403(2)(A), 403(2)(B)) (stating "[e]ach state shall be entitled to receive from the Secretary
a bonus each year for which the state demonstrates a net decrease in out-of-wedlock births," totaling up to
$25,000,000).
342. Id.
343. Id. at 26-7.
344. Wilson v. State, 631 S.E.2d 391 (Ga. Ct. App. 2006).
345. Koch, supra note 324 (discussing debate sparked by Wilson opinion among state legislatures).
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attended a friend's New Year's Eve party held at a hotel in Douglasville, Georgia. 346
Wilson, along with several of his male classmates, received oral sex from a fifteen-yearold classmate, Tracy. 347 After investigating the incident and recovering a videotape of
various sexual encounters that took place at the party, police officers arrested Wilson and
five other seventeen-year-old males for a variety of sexual offenses.348 Wilson's charge
was aggravated child molestation resulting from oral sex he engaged in with Tracy.34 9
At the time of Wilson's arrest, Georgia law classified sex, including oral sex, with any
person under the age of sixteen as aggravated child molestation, regardless of the age
difference between the two individuals. 3 50 This charge carried a statutory minimum of
ten years imprisonment, and required defendants to register as sex offenders. 35 1
Wilson decided to risk trial rather than submit to registration, while the other
young men accepted plea bargains.352 The jury found that the voluntary act of oral sex
by a person over the age of sixteen with someone under the age of sixteen, regardless of
consent, 3 53 satisfied the elements of aggravated sexual assault. 354 The jury sentenced
Wilson to ten years in prison and required his registration as a sex offender. 355 Wilson's
case, along with the sentencing of his classmate Marcus Dixon, 35 6 brought national
attention to Georgia's teen sex laws and placed pressure on its legislature to amend its
aggravated child molestation law. 3 57 Accordingly, Georgia amended its law reducing
Wilson's crime to a misdemeanor, 358 but failed to make the amendment retroactive. 359
Wilson spent two years in jail before the Georgia Supreme Court finally authorized his
release in 2007, based on the premise that his punishment was cruel and unusual. 360
In response to Wilson's punishment 361 and the national crackdown on statutory
rape,362 several states enacted legislation eliminating the prosecution of consensual teen
346. Moore, supra note 316, at 197 (citing Wright Thompson, ESPNcom The Magazine: Outrageous
Injustice, http://sports.espn.go.comlespn/eticket/story?page=Wilson (last accessed Oct. 17, 2009)).
347. Id. at 198.
348. Id at 198-9.
349. Id at 199.
350. Id (citing GA. CODE ANN. § 16-6-4(c) (West 2009)).
351. Moore, supranote 316, at 199 (citing § 16-6-4(c)).
352. Id. at 200 (citing GA. CODE ANN. § 42-1-15 (West 2006) (stating this law would have prevented Wilson
from living with his little sister as sex offenders were prohibited from living within "1,000 ft. of any child care
facility, church, or area where minors congregate")).
353. Id. at 201. Moore explains consent was an issue at trial, but there was considerable evidence Michelle
consented to the sexual acts she committed. Id.
354. Id
355. Moore, supranote 316, at 201 (citing Wilson v. State, 631 S.E.2d 391, 392 (Ga. Ct. App. 2006)); Kathy
Gill, Injustice in Georgia: The Case of Genarlow Wilson, http://uspolitics.about.com/b/2007/01/26/injustice-ingeorgia-the-case-of-genarlow-wilson.htm (last accessed Oct. 17, 2009) (stating, "At the same time that Wilson
was being sentenced to ten years in prison, down the hall in the courthouse, a twenty-seven-year-old teacher
got a slap on the wrist (probation) for having sexual intercourse with a sixteen-year-old male student").
356. Moore, supranote 316, at 201; see Dixon v. State, 596 S.E.2d 147 (Ga. 2004) (sentencing Dixon to .ten
years imprisonment for having sex with a girl two years and three months younger than himself).
357. Moore, supra note 316, at 201.
358. Id. (citing GA. CODE ANN. § 16-6-4 (West 2008)).
359. Id.
360. Id at 202.
361. Wendy Koch, States Ease Laws That Punish Teens for Sex with Minors, USATODAY.COM,
http://www.usatoday.com/news/nation/2007-07-24-teen-sex-offendersN.htm (last visited Feb. 2, 2011).
362. Id.; see supra notes 250-315.
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sex.363 Proponents of this legislation believed tough laws regulating teen sex needed
amendment to focus on predators, not teenagers. 364 The belief that juvenile offenders
were less likely than adult sex offenders to commit another offense and were more
susceptible to rehabilitation, was another basis for amending laws regulating teen sex.
365

A common misconception concerning statutory rape is that states strictly define
only one age of consent, meaning intercourse with any individual below this statutorily
prescribed age is illegal, without regard to any other factors.366 This was the prevailing
view at one point.367 Under this structure, even if the male is the same age as the female,
or younger, and they are both below the age of consent, prosecution for felony statutory
rape is a likely outcome. 3 68
In actuality, this represents a very small minority of state statutory rape laws.369
Statutory rape laws no longer solely criminalize male conduct. 370 Furthermore, the vast
majority of states consider various factors such as "age differentials, minimum age of the
victim, and minimum age of the defendant," as mitigating factors. 3 71 Lawmakers and
prosecutors commonly refer to these mitigating circumstances as "Romeo and Juliet"
exceptions to statutory rape. 372 "Romeo and Juliet" laws mitigate penalties or
completely exculpate consensual teen activities when both are close in age, yet one is
below the legal age of consent. 3 73 Thirty-nine states use "Romeo and Juliet" exceptions
to decriminalize punishment for voluntary sexual interactions among teens of similar age
and maturity.374 For example, a state will typically set a minimum age for a possible
defendant, commonly sixteen or seventeen, 375 and specify the behavior is not criminal if
the defendant is no more than a certain number of years older than the victim, typically
between two and four years.376 Additionally, forty-five states and Washington D.C.
mitigate at least the punishment for statutory rape from a felony to a misdemeanor based
on the age span between the two teens. 377

363. Koch, supra note 361 (citing Texas, Oklahoma, Arizona, Florida, Oregon, Connecticut, and Indiana as
states that had mitigated punishment for consensual sexual acts among teens in response to Wilson and
SORNA).
364. Id.
365. Id. (citing Allison Taylor, executive director of the Texas Council on Sex Offender Treatment).
366. ASAPH GLOSSER, KAREN GARDINER & MIKE FISHMAN, STATUTORY RAPE: A GUIDE TO STATE LAWS
AND REPORTING REQUIREMENTS 7 (2004) available at http://aspe.hhs.gov/hsp/08/SR/StateLaws/ (last visited
Oct. 11, 2009).
367. Michael J. Higdon, Queer Teens and Legislative Bullies: The Cruel and Invidious Discrimination
Behind HeterosexistStatutory Rape Laws, 42 U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 195, 225 (2008).
368. Id.
369. GLOSSER ET AL., supra note 366, at 7.
370. COCCA, supra note 318, at 22.
371. GLOSSER ET AL., supra note 366, at 7.
372. Higdon, supra note 367, at 226.
373. Id. at 225-6.
374. GLOSSER ET AL., supra note 366, at 7. The eleven states without "Romeo and Juliet" exceptions are:
California, Georgia, Idaho, Illinois, Kansas, Kentucky, Massachusetts, Michigan, New Hampshire, New York,
and Wisconsin. Id. at 6-7.
375. No Easy Answers: Sex Offender Laws in the US, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH (Sept. 11, 2007),
http://www.hrw.org/en/node/10685/section/8.
376. Cohen, supra note 324, at 734.
377. Id. at 734, n.119. These statutes are: ALA. CODE § 13A-6-62(a)(1) (West 2009); ALASKA STAT. §§
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Reflective of the current status of statutory rape laws, in which the vast majority do
not criminalize consensual teen sex, 378 most Americans would agree that consensual
teen sex is not worthy of criminal sanction. 379 The fact that victimization is not a product
of consensual teen sex explains why many no longer consider criminal sanctions
necessary.380 Comparably, a teen that takes a nude, or semi-nude, picture of themselves
and sends it to their significant other is not victimized by their own conduct. 38 1
Likewise, this conduct requires decriminalization.382
As discussed previously, the impetus for charging teens with sexting offenses is
deterrence of teen sexual encounters, as evidenced through The Welfare Reform Act. 383
The Welfare Reform Act similarly spurred zealous enforcement of state statutory rape
laws in order to receive large amounts of state funding, thus furthering the government's
goal of discouraging teen pregnancy and teen sex. 384 It took the cases of Genarlow
Wilson385 and others like his386 to make states realize that punishment for teen sex
victimized the teen, not the sex itself.387 The overwhelming majority of state legislatures
determined the need to protect teens from excessive punishment surpassed their desire to
11.41.434(a), 11.41.436(a), 11.41.438(a), 11.41.440(a)(1) (2009); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-1407F (2009);
ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 5-14-110(a)(2)(B), 5-14-125(5)(B)(i), 5-14-126(2)(B), 5-14-127(a) ( 2009); CAL. PENAL
CODE § 261.5(b)(c) (West 2009); COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-3-402(1)(d) (2009); CONN. GEN. STAT. §§ 53a-70(a),
53a-71(a)(1) (2009); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, §§ 770(a)(2), 771(a)(1), 772(a)(2)g, 773(a)(5) (2009); D.C. CODE
§§ 22-3008, 22-3009 (2009); FLA. STAT. § 794.05(1) (2009); GA. CODE ANN. § 16-6-3(b)(c) (2009); HAW.
REV. STAT. §§ 707-730(1)(c)(i), 707-732(1)(c)(i) (2009); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 18-1508A(1) (2009); 720 ILL.
COMP. STAT. 5/12-14.1(a)(1) (2009); IND. CODE § 35-42-4-9 (2009); IOWA CODE ANN. §§ 709.4(2)(c)(4),
709.12(4) (West 2009); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 510.050(1)(a), 510.060(1)(a), 510.130(l)(b)(c) (West 2009);
LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:43.1(A) (2008); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A §§ 254, 255-A, 260 (2009); MD.
CODE ANN. CRIM. LAW §§ 3-304(a)(3), 3-306(a)(3), 3-307(a)(3)-(S), 3-308(b)(2)(3) (West 2009); MICH.
COMP. LAWS. § 750.520e(1)(a) (2009); MINN. STAT. §§ 609.342(2009); MISS. CODE ANN. § 97-3-65 (West
2009); Mo. REV. STAT. §§ 566.034, 566.064 (2009); MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 45-5-502(3),, 45-5-503(3)(a)
(2008); NEB. REV. STAT. §28-320.01(1) (2009); NEv. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 200.368, 200.364 3(b) (West 2008)
(amended by 2009 Nev. Stat. Ch. 68); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 632-A:4 (1) (2009); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:142 (West 2009); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-9-1 l(G(1)[?] (West 2009); N.Y. PENAL LAW §§ 130.25, 130.30, 130.35,
130.40, 130.45, 130.50 (McKinney 2009); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 14-27.2(a)(1), 14-27.4(a)(1), 14-27.7A (2009);
N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 12.1-20-03, 12.1-20-07 (2009); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2907.04 (LexisNexis 2009);
OKLA. STAT. tit. 21, § 1112 (2009); OR. REV. STAT. § 163.345 (2009); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 3122.1,
3126(a)(8) (West 2009); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-37-6 (2008); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 22-22-7 (2009); TENN.
CODE ANN. §39-13-506(a) ( 2009); TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. §§ 21.11(b), 22.011(e) (West 2009); UTAH CODE
ANN. §§ 76-5-401(3), 76-5-401.1(2)(3), 76-5-402.2(2) (LexisNexis 2009); VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-63 (2009);
WASH. REV. CODE §§ 9A.44.073(1), 9A.44.076(1), 9A.44.079(l), 9A.44.083(l), 9A.44.086(1), 9A.44.089(1)
(2009); W. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 61-8B-3(a)(2), 61-8B-5(a)(2), 61-8B-7(a)(3), 61-8B-9(b) (West 2009); WYO.
STAT. ANN. §§ 6-2-303(a)(v), 6-2-304(a)(i). Id
378. See Finer, supra note 196, at 74 (explaining a minority of adults believe pre-marital teen sex is
inherently wrong).
379. See supra notes 369-77 (explaining the current status of statutory rape laws generally do not criminalize
consensual teen sex).
380. See Smith, supra note 60, at 526 (stating many believe voluntary teen sex is generally not worthy of
punishment). This is presumably because the teens are not deemed capable of exploiting themselves, due to
their similar levels of maturity. See id.
381. Id. at 529 (explaining minors who voluntarily engage in producing sexual images of themselves should
not be considered victimized in any way).
382. See id.
383. See supra notes 195-201(citing Pub. L. No. 104-193 § 912, 110 Stat. 2105).
384. See supra notes 339-45.
385. See Wilson v. State, 631 S.E.2d 391 (Ga. Ct. App. 2006).
386. See Dixon v. State, 596 S.E.2d 147 (Ga. 2004).
387. Moore, supra note 316,, at 202 (explaining Wilson's punishment was the catalyst for amending
Georgia's laws criminalizing consensual teen sex).
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deter teen sex through the enforcement of statutory rape laws.3 88 Hopefully, the same
realization, as manifested through cases such as Miller, will force every state legislature
to follow the lead of the few states that have addressed sexting and amended their child
pornography laws. 3 89
Statutory rape has had hundreds of years to evolve and conform to the current state
of societal norms concerning teen sex. 390 Sexting is an extremely new phenomenon by
any standard. 39 1 Accordingly, child pornography statutes should draw guidance from
statutory rape statutes and similarly take into account the age of the producer of the
image when criminalizing conduct. 392
2.

A Guideline for States Based on "Romeo and Juliet" Exceptions and the
Recent Actions of States

To ensure the intended purpose of child pornography laws remains intact, the
amendments must consider multiple factors. 3 93 The age of the producer of the image
most certainly should be a factor in determining criminal liability for the production and
possession of child pornography. 394 Analogously to statutory rape, if the producer of the
image is below the age of eighteen, production and possession of the image does not
justify criminalization. 395
As the dissent in A.H. v. State explains, when criminalizing the dissemination of
the image, the teen producer's intent should be a controlling factor in assigning criminal
sanctions to the conduct.396 If the teen producing the sexting image sends it to only one
person, namely another teen of similar maturity level, then neither the dissemination nor
the production of the image warrants criminal penalty.3 97 However, a teen like Jesse
Logan's boyfriend, who disseminated an image he did not produce to a large group of
people, deserves criminal punishment for his actions.398 This conduct is worthy of
criminal punishment because the victimization and exploitation of the minor subject
resulting from this type of behavior is the precise consequence child pornography laws
were enacted to prevent. 39 9
The recent legislative amendments in response to sexting are useful guidelines to
388. See supra notes 369-77 (demonstrating the vast majority of states do not criminalize, or mitigate
punishment, if the two teens are similar in age).
389. See Miller, 605 F. Supp. 2d 634 (M.D. Pa. 2009) (detailing the unsubstantiated claims of a morally
driven prosecutor).
390. COCCA, supra note 318, at 11.
391. See Miller, 605 F. Supp. 2d 634. This case from March 2009 is currently the only widely reported trial
decision concerning sexting. Id.
392. See supra notes. 372-3.
393. See supra notes. 18-59 (explaining the intent behind child pornography laws is to impede coercion and
abuse of children).
394. See GLOSSER ET AL., supra note 366, at 7 (demonstrating that most states take the age of the
participants into account when determining whether criminal sanctions are appropriate for teen sexual
behavior).
395. See Higdon, supra note 367, at 225-6.
396. See A.H. v. State, 949 So. 2d 234, 239-41 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2007) (Padovano, J., dissenting).
397. See id.
398. See Celizic, supra note 143.
399. See id (detailing that Jesse was not victimized until after the image was produced and sent by her
boyfriend to numerous female classmates; thus causing her daily shame and embarrassment).
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states in many aspects.400 Legislation by states such as Utah and Ohio, downgrades
punishment from a felony to a misdemeanor based on the age of the person either
producing or disseminating the image.401 Although positive steps, such legislation fails
to differentiate between the intent of the producer and the intent of the disseminator.402
Nebraska's affirmative defense decriminalizing minor possession of an image if the
image depicts only one child, is not coerced, and is not disseminated, more adequately
assigns the appropriate level of punishment based on the intent of teens. 40 3 Vermont's
sexting legislation moving teen sexting offenses to juvenile courts is another necessary
04
change in light of SORNA's expansive reach. 4
In sum, the teen producer of a sexting image is not worthy of criminal punishment
if the image is voluntarily produced, sent to one or no persons, and depicts solely the
teen producer.405 If the state decides to punish the teen producer, a separate child
pornography offense adjudicated in juvenile court is necessary to bolster the likelihood
the teen will not face sex offender registration. 4 06 On the contrary, a teen who did not
produce the sexting image and subsequently sent it to multiple people in an effort to
exploit and ridicule the subject is worthy of whatever punishment the state deems fit, due
to the abuse and irreversible harm this conduct inflicts on the teen subject. 4 07
IV.

CONCLUSION

Sexting provides a telling look into the private, sexual lives of teens. 4 08 This
insight disturbs both parents and law enforcement officers alike. 4 09 Sexting displays a
reckless, possibly immoral, attitude towards sex among today's youth.410 However, the
underlying beliefs pertaining to the sexuality of the teen producer do not require
rectification by the state. 4 11 Parents are the archetypes of sexual mores and behavior for
their teen children.412 Consequently, teen education concerning the appropriateness of
sexual behavior should primarily be delegated to parents in the home. 4 13 Child
pornography laws are not intended as a state-endorsed vehicle to educate teens
concerning the proper role of sex in teen life. 4 14 The state's decision to charge teens for
producing sexually suggestive images under statutes designed to mitigate coercive acts
of adults, shows the state's motivation is regulation of teen sexual interactions, not

400. See Greenberg,supra note 156.
401. See H. 14, 2009 Gen. Sess. (Utah 2009); S. 103, 128th Gen. Assemb. (Ohio 2009).
402. See id.
403. See Leg. 97, 101st Leg., Ist Reg. Sess. (Neb. 2009).
404. See S. 125, Reg. Sess. (Vt. 2009).
405. See supra notes 394-9.
406. See supra notes 270-6.
407. See supra notes 18-59 (explaining the intent of child pornography laws is mitigation of child abuse).
408. See Johnson, supra note 89 (discussing the parents and lawmakers concerns in recent years over
sexting).
409. Id.
410. See generally Smith, supra note 60 (discussing the moral issues concerning "self-produced teen
pornography" and the necessity to distinguish this conduct from criminal conduct).
411. See id at 529.
412. Shtarkshall et al., supra note 211, at 116.
413. Id.
414. See supra notes 18-59 and accompanying text (discussing the statutes' intent is to rectify child abuse).
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diminishment of child abuse. This improper motivation, coupled with the far-reaching
and irreversible effects of sex offender registry, demonstrate the necessity of amendment
to child pornography laws to reflect the age and intent of the teen producer.
Megan Myers
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